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PROTECTING THE INMATE'S RIGHT TO REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS-Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d
358 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
Abstract" Antipsychotic drugs are used to treat mentally ill inmates in Washington prisons. Previously, inmates who refused drugs were entitled to an administrative hearing
before involuntary treatment began. Harper v. State recognized a constitutional liberty
interest in refusing antipsychotics, and established new measures, including a judicial
hearing, notice, and appointed counsel, to protect the prisoner's interest. A due process
analysis of the right to refuse demonstrates that the court's procedures may not go far
enough to protect the inmate from unwanted treatment that cannot cure the mental illness
and that may cause disabling side effects. Clearer definitions of state interests in involuntary treatment and provision of expert assistance for prisoners refusing drugs are necessary
to effectively protect prisoners' liberty.

Antipsychotic drugs' are used in Washington prisons to control and
treat inmates with psychoses or schizophrenia. Initially, antipsychotics
act as a powerful sedative. 2 With time, they reduce the symptoms of
psychosis and curb violent tendencies, 3 achieving the correctional end:
control. But antipsychotic medication will not cure mental illness.
Moreover, continued treatment may cause side effects, 4 including
complex movement disorders that may be irreversible.
Administering antipsychotic drugs historically did not require the
consent of the inmate.' Only minimal procedures stood between an
inmate's refusal and forced drug treatment.6 The Washington
1. The term "antipsychotic drug" refers to a broad subclass of agents known as
psychotropics; antipsychotics are also known as "neuroleptics" or "major tranquilizers." Harper
v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 876 n.3, 759 P.2d 358, 361 n.3 (1988), cert granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337
(1989). Some of the most commonly used antipsychotic drugs include Thorazine, Serentil,
Mellaril, Prolixin, and Navane. P. BREGGIN, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS: HAZARDS TO THE BRAIN 9
(1983).
2. See Gaughan & LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patientto Refuse Antipsychotic Drugsin an
Institution, 4 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43, 51 (1978).
3. See Kemna, Current Status of InstitutionalizedMental Health Patients'Right to Refuse
Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 110 (1985).
4. Id. at 111-14; see infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and
hazards of antipsychotic drug treatment).
5. Goedecke v. State Dep't of Institutions, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979), may have been
the first case to declare that individuals have a right to refuse antipsychotics drugs. Gutheil &
Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," 'Artificial Competence," and Genuine
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 80
(1983) [hereinafter, Mind Control].
6. See Department of Corrections Institutional Policy and Procedures No. 13.210 (June 25,
1985); Harper v. State, No. 85-2-00394-1, at 3-6 (Snohomish County Super. Ct. May 12, 1987)
(citing Special Offender Center Policy No. 600.30), rev'd, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988).
The Department of Corrections ("DOC") and Special Offender Center ("SOC") adopted these
administrative review procedures after decisions indicated that some review was required prior to
transferring a prisoner to a mental health facility. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (due
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Supreme Court responded to the inmate's lack of due process protection in Harper v. State.7 The court held that prisoners have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing treatment with
antipsychotic drugs, and that the prison authorities' existing procedures did not adequately protect against erroneous deprivation of that
interest.8 The court laid out new procedures, including a judicial hearing, for determining whether an inmate should be involuntarily
drugged.'
The new procedures guarantee that a prisoner receives a meaningful
opportunity to rebut the necessity of drug treatment. However, the
court adopted a standard list of four compelling state interests which
may override a patient's refusal of treatment.' 0 The court apparently
did not consider whether these interests apply in the context of involuntary treatment with antipsychotics. Further, the court did not provide the assistance of an expert witness for the inmate, nor for an
independent psychiatric examination, either of which would greatly
support the inmate's case against forced drugging. Thus, although
the Harper court took important steps to protect the rights of prisoners, the new procedures provide insufficient protection for inmates and
ineffective guidance for courts.
I.

ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS: TREATMENT AND PROCESS

A.

The Use of Antipsychotic Drugs To Treat Mental Illness

Since their development in the 1950's, anitpsychotic drugs have
enjoyed the status of "treatment of choice" for severe mental disorders, including psychosis and schizophrenia.1 1 Psychiatrists prefer
antipsychotic drugs almost universally over other types of treatment,
viewing the drugs as more humane and effective than other forms of
process entitles a prisoner to a hearing prior to transfer to a state mental hospital); Harmon v.
McNutt, 91 Wash. 2d 126, 130, 587 P.2d 537, 539 (1978) (prisoners must be afforded a judicial
hearing prior to transfer to a mental health facility); see infra note 75.
7. 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 882, 759 P.2d at 364.
10. Id. at 883, 759 P.2d at 364.
11. See Mind Control, supra note 5, at 99-101; D. JESTE & R. WYATT, UNDERSTANDING
AND TREATING TARDIVE DYSKINESIA 1 (1982). Antipsychotics are credited with greatly
reducing inpatient treatment. Id.; see also Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 182-83 (1980) (hospital
populations dropped from over 500,000 in 1950 to less than 200,000 in 1979, and hospital stays
fell from about 44 days in 1971 to 26 by 1975, primarily because of the use of antipsychotic
drugs).
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treatment 2 such as mechanical restraints and seclusion.1 3 But the
drugs have also become well known for their disturbing side effects,
leading many patients to refuse to consent to treatment with
antipsychotics.' 4
1.

Antipsychotic Drugs in Prison

The Washington Department of Corrections ("DOC") uses antipsychotic drugs to treat mentally ill inmates who are dangerous, or are
otherwise severely mentally ill.15 The DOC often transfers mentally ill
6
inmates to the Special Offenders Center ("SOC") for treatment.'
Prior to Harper, between sixty-five and eighty-seven percent of SOC

inmates received antipsychotic drugs. 7 Although most inmates took
the drugs voluntarily, the SOC administered drugs to between fifteen
and twenty-five prisoners against their will. 8

12. See Mind Control,supranote 5, at 99-101 (1983); Plotkin, Limiting the TherapeuticOrgy:
Mental Patients' Right To Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 474-79 (1977).
13. DOC policies allow the use of seclusion rooms for temporary placement of suicidal and
self-destructive inmates only when less restrictive treatment alternatives have proven ineffective.
Department of Corrections Institutional Policy and Procedures No. 13.197 (1986); see also Saks,
The Use of MechanicalRestraints in PsychiatricHospitals,95 YALE L.J. 1836 (1986) (discussing
the ill effects of mechanical restraints). One Seattle newspaper reported that Harperis forcing
local hospitals to use seclusion and restraints in lieu of antipsychotic drugs. The Seattle Times,
Sept. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
14. See, eg., Bloom, Faulkner, Holm & Rawlinson, An Empirical View ofPatientsExercising
Their Right To Refuse Treatment, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHOLOGY 315, 320 (1984) (finding that
24% of a group of involuntarily committed patients refused treatment with antipsychotics); see
also Young, Bloom, Faulkner, Rogers & Pati, Treatment Refusal Among ForensicInpatients, 15
BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 6 (1987) (explaining that 35 of 358 forensic inpatients
refused treatment over an eight-month period in one hospital). However, many patients refuse
for reasons other than the risk of side effects. Id at 8; see also Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Boston
State Hospital Case: "InvoluntaryMind Control," the Constitution, and the "Right to Rot," 137
AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 720, 722 (1980) (discussing nonconsensual treatment depending on the
patient's reason for refusing antipsychotic drugs).
15. Department of Corrections Institutional Policy and Procedures No. 13.210, supra note 6.
The Policy allows involuntary medication of inmates who are unable to provide their essential
needs of health and safety, or who manifest severe deterioration in cognitive or volitional control.
16. The SOC provides diagnosis and treatment to up to 144 convicted felons who are
mentally ill. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 875, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (1988), cert granted,109
S.Ct. 1337 (1989).
17. Telephone interview with Gary Wellman, Health Manager of the SOC (Nov. 4, 1988)
(notes on file with Washington Law Review). An average of 80 to 100 inmates accept the drugs
voluntarily. Id.
18. Id Following Harper,the SOC halted all involuntary drug treatment; as of Nov. 4, 1988,
only one inmate was receiving antipsychotic drugs against his will, pursuant to authorization by
the Snohomish County Superior Court, and two more cases were pending.

Washington Law Review
2.

Vol. 64:459, 1989

Benefits and Hazards of Antipsychotic Drug Treatment

Like all drugs, antipsychotics produce both beneficial and adverse
effects. Although research concerning the drugs' benefits and risks is
inconclusive,19 it is clear that antipsychotic drugs do not, by themselves, cure mental illness. E°
The benefits of antipsychotic drugs include reducing many major
symptoms of psychosis and schizophrenia."1 The drugs alleviate hallucinations, delusions, and paranoid ideation.22 Because patients are
sedated 3 and no longer subject to the voices and visions of their
mental illness, their violent and self-destructive tendencies greatly
diminish. 4
Antipsychotics' adverse effects are frequent and diverse. The most
common and disturbing effects include dystonia, 5 akathesia, z6 parkinsonism, z7 tardive dyskinesia, z8 sexual dysfunctions,2 9 and many inter19. A huge body of research has developed concerning benefits and risks of antipsychotic
drug treatment, but it is still not known, for example, exactly how antipsychotic drugs work. See
D. JESTE & R. WYATT, supra note 11, at 2; Kemna, supra note 3, at 110-1i.
20. Researchers generally concede this at the outset. See, e.g., D. JEsTE & R. WYATT, supra
note 11, at 1; Kemna, supra note 3, at 110.
21. See Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment with
Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1135, 1139-40 (1987) (citing studies
describing the antipsychotic effect). See generally Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 2, at 47-50
(discussing general justifications for the use of antipsychotics to treat mental illness).
22. Kemna, supra note 3, at I10.
23. P. BREGGIN, supra note 1, at 31.
24. See id. at 56-59. Breggin asserts that the pioneers of antipsychotic drugs intended them
to induce pacification by rendering patients indifferent, apathetic, and easily controlled. Id. at
17.
25. Dystonia is generally characterized by muscle spasms in the face, throat, lips and tongue,
and grimacing. Greenblatt, Shader & DiMascio, Extrapyramidal Effects, in PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUG SIDE EFFECTS: CLINICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 92, 93-94 (1977)
[hereinafter PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS]. Dystonia occurs in 21% to 94% of patients
who are not also treated with prophylactic agents. Arana, Goff, Baldessarini & Keepers, Efficacy
of Anticholinergic Prophylaxisfor Neuroleptic-InducedAcute Dystonia, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
993 (1988).
26. Patients with akathesia are unable to sit still and are in a state of constant agitation and
restlessness. Greenblatt, Shader & DiMascio, supra note 25, at 93-94; see also Burke, Tardive
Dyskinesia: Current Clinical Issues, 34 NEUROLOGY 1348, 1350 (1984).
27. Parkinsonian reactions fall into two general categories: Akinesia, associated with rigidity
and a mask-like face, and tremor in the hands and fingers. Greenblatt, Shader & DiMascio,
supra note 25, at 93-94.
28. Tardive dyskinesia ("TD") causes involuntary, repetitive, purposeless movements. Most
often, the effect is concentrated in the face and mouth, and consists of otherwise ordinary
motions such as licking, smacking the lips, sucking, or chewing. TD can also affect muscles in
the arms, hands, and trunk. Casey & Gerlach, Tardive Dyskinesia: Management and New
Treatment, in GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS: A CLINICAL HANDBOOK
183, 183-85 (1984). See generally P. BREGGIN, supra note 1, at 86-109; D. JESTE & R. WYATT,
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nal disorders unrelated to movement.3 0 Many of the adverse effects of
antipsychotic drugs can be controlled with other medications, or can
be reversed by discontinuing treatment with antipsychotics.3 1
Among antipsychotics' adverse effects, tardive dyskinesia ("TD") is
perhaps the most severe.3 2 The jerky motions and facial distortions of

TD are grotesque, so the discomfort of the disorder is as much social

as it is physical.3 3 TD may occur during or long after treatment,3 4 and
is often permanent and incurable.3 5 Moreover, TD is generally
masked by the treatment itself. 6 Thus, the doctor's awareness of the
risk of TD does not ensure prevention. Finally, TD is common,
occurring in ten to fifty percent 7 of those treated with antipsychotics

for six months or more.

8

supra note 11, at 44-54; TARDivE DYsIUNEsIA 201-31 (E. Fann, R. Smith, J. Davis & E.
Domino eds. 1980).
29. In male patients, antipsychotics can cause decreased libido, decreased intensity or painful
orgasm, and retrograde ejaculation (in which semen is forced into the bladder rather than the
urethra). Shader, Male Sexual Function, in PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS, supra note 25,
at 63-76; see also Gold and Justino, "Bicycle Kickstand" Phenomenon: Prolonged Erections
Associated with AntipsychoticAgents, 81 S.MED. J. 792 (1988) (describing enduring but painless
erections, unaccompanied by orgasm and ejaculation, which the authors characterize as a
nonadverse side effect).
30. These include disorders related to the stomach and bowels, liver, blood, thyroid,
metabolic functions, and menstrual functions. Acute poisoning with antipsychotics sometimes
causes death. See generally PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS, supra note 25, at 25-62,
164-205, 214-34.
31. Greenblatt, Shader & DiMascio, supra note 25, at 94-95.
32. See supra note 28 (discussing TD). One author notes that the number of sufferers may be
as high as 198,000. P. BREGGne, supra note 1, at 106.
33. Gardos & Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 776, 777 (1980).
34. P. BREGGIN, supra note 1, at 92. Note, however, that most research indicates that TD
generally arises within a few weeks of discontinuation. See Burke, supranote 26, at 1349; Gardos
& Cole, supra note 33, at 780.
35. Sea eg., D. JESTE & R. WYATt, supra note 11, at 31 (TD is reversible in a little over onethird of patients); Gardos & Cole, supranote 33, at 777-78 (spontaneous remission may occur in.
up to 40% of cases).
36. Casey & Gerlach, supra note 28, at 189; Gardos & Cole, supra note 33, at 778.
Interestingly, because treatment with antipsychotics masks or suppresses TD, psychiatrists often
"treat" TD by continuing to medicate the patient with the drugs that caused the disorder. P.
BREGGIN, supra note 1, at 99-103; Burke, supra note 26, at 1350; Casey & Gerlach, supra note
28, at 193.
37. The data on prevalence of TD varies widely. See, e-g., D. JEsTE & R. WYATT, supra note
11, at 23-27 (more recent research shows higher rates of TD than did earlier studies); Casey &
Gerlach, supra note 28, at 187 (reporting rates of 0.5% to 56%); Gardos & Cole, supra note 33,
776-77.
38. Barnes, Kidger, Traur & Taylor, Reclassification of the Tardive Dyskinesia Syndrome, in
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B. Involuntary Drug Treatment Priorto Harper
Prior to Harper, an inmate refusing to take antipsychotic drugs
received an administrative hearing to determine whether to administer
the drugs involuntarily.3 9 SOC procedures gave the inmate a hearing
before a committee composed of a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the
SOC associate superintendent.' The inmate received twenty four
hours' notice, the assistance of a lay adviser, and was entitiled to be
present.4 1 The SOC committee reviewed the decision periodically, and
the inmate could appeal to the SOC superintendent.4 2
The SOC procedures did not include representation by counsel or
an independent decisionmaker.4 3 Further, committee members typically met with SOC staff members before the hearing.' Thus, the
SOC staff was able to present its case twice, both prior to and at the
hearing. The inmate could not gain judicial review of the SOC decision
except by personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ. 5
C. ProceduralProtection Established in Harper
Following his 1976 incarceration,4 6 Walter Harper submitted voluntarily to treatment with antipsychotic drugs.47 Then, in 1982, he
refused the antipsychotic medication. The SOC proceeded according
to its policy, determined that Harper was a danger to others due to
mental disorder,48 and began forcing him to take antipsychotics.4 9 For
the next two and one-half years, Harper was kept on antipsychotic
drugs almost continuously." He sued Washington State under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"' contending that SOC
procedures provided inadequate protection under the due process
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 878, 759 P.2d 358, 362 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989).
41. Id. at 879, 759 P.2d at 362.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 879, 759 P.2d at 362-63.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 874-75, 759 P.2d at 360.
47. Id. at 875, 759 P.2d at 360.
48. Id.
49. Id. Harper's case was subsequently reviewed every two weeks; each time, the committee
ordered continued drug treatment.
50. Harper v. State, No. 85-2-00394-1, at 8-9 (Snohomish County Super. Ct. May 12, 1987),
rev'd, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988).
51. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 875 n.1, 759 P.2d at 360 n.1.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 The trial court dismissed
Harper's complaint following trial.53
On direct appeal, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that a
prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotic drugs.5 4 Further, due process requires a judicial hearing
prior to deprivation of this liberty interest.5" The inmate must receive
reasonable notice and be assisted by counsel.5 6 The judge at the hearing may order involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs only if
the state proves a compelling interest, and that treatment with anti7
psychotics is both necessary and effective for furthering that interest.

The court relied on its earlier decision in In re Schuoler 8 in finding
a liberty interest in refusing treatment with antipsychotic drugs. In

Schuoler, the court held that a committed mental patient has a constitutionally protected right to refuse electroconvulsive therapy
("ECT"),59 because of its intrusiveness and adverse effects.' The

Harper court found that involuntary treatment with antipsychotics is
no less intrusive than ECT.6 '
At a Harper hearing, the judge must determine whether the inmate
is competent to refuse treatment.6 2 If the judge finds that the inmate is
incompetent to make the decision, the judge makes a "substituted
judgment," based on evidence about the prisoner's background, reli52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. Harper also made state-law tort claims for assault,
battery, and outrage. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 875 n.1, 759 P.2d at 361 n.l. The Supreme Court
remanded these claims to the lower court for consideration. IM at 885-86, 759 P.2d at 366.
53. Harper 110 Wash. 2d at 875-76, 759 P.2d at 361.
54. Id. at 876, 759 P.2d at 361. The court failed to specify whether it was referring to the
federal Constitution or to the state constitution. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
55. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 881-83, 759 P.2d at 3664.
56. Id. at 884, 759 P.2d at 365.
57. Id. at 883, 759 P.2d at 364 (citing In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 508, 723 P.2d 1103,
1108 (1986)).
58. 106 Wash. 2d 500, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986).
59. ECT , popularly known as electroshock treatment, involves inducing convulsions and
unconsciousness with electric current. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 412
(1983).
60. Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 506, 723 P.2d at 1107-08. These adverse effects include loss of
short- and long-term memory, and reduced learning ability.
61. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 878, 759 P.2d at 362. The interest in refusing drugs survives
criminal conviction, incarceration, and civil commitment. Id at 882, 759 P.2d at 364.
62. Id at 883, 759 P.2d at 365. A committed individual is not presumed to be incompetent to
make a specific treatment decisions. See, eg., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D.
Ohio 1980); State ex rel Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 416 N.W.2d 883, 895 (1987).
See generally Hardisty, Mental Illnes" A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. REV. 735, 740-45 (1973)
(describing tests for competency in various contexts).
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gion, and other relevant factors.63 If the judge finds that the inmate
would consent if competent, then the judge orders the treatment. But
if the judge concludes that the inmate would refuse treatment if competent, then the judge balances the inmate's interest with the state's
interest in compulsory treatment. 64
The Harper court borrowed from Schuoler a nonexclusive list of
four state interests that may be sufficient to overcome the inmate's
right to refuse. These include preserving life, protecting third parties'
interests, preventing suicide, and maintaining the ethical integrity of
the medical profession.65 If a compelling interest exists, then the court
decides whether the treatment is necessary and effective for furthering
that interest. 66 However, Harper provides no guidance for determining the effectiveness or necessity of antipsychotic drug treatment.
The decision in Harper goes far toward protecting an inmate's right
to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. But lower courts will be
hampered by the Harper court's failure to define clearly state interests
relevant to drug treatment, and to provide guidance on the question of
the necessity and effectiveness of unwanted drug treatment. Furthermore, the decision is silent regarding the inmate's right to an expert
witness or to an independent examination. Thus, the advantages of a
judicial hearing will be qualified by the inmate's inability to present a
case against antipsychotic drug treatment.
II.

BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE
INMATE AND THE STATE: DUE PROCESS FOR
THE MENTALLY ILL PRISONER

A.

The Due Process Rights of Prisoners

Prisoners lose many, but not all, of their constitutional rights when
incarcerated. The existence of federal due process protection depends
on the nature of the deprivation-whether it constitutes a liberty or
property interest implicated by the fourteenth amendment.67 Pro63. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 883, 759 P.2d at 365; see In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827,
839-40, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369-70 (1984).
64. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 883, 759 P.2d at 364; Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 842, 689 P.2d at
1371.
65. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 883, 759 P.2d at 364. See Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d at 508, 723
P.2d at 1108; see also Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 842, 689 P.2d at 1371; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983), modified, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984).
66. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 883, 759 P.2d at 364.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (whether
procedural protections are due depends on the weight of the individual's interest, and whether
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tected interests may arise directly from the federal Constitution,6" or
from positive rights created by state law. 9
Criminal conviction suspends or extinguishes many of an individual's liberty interests. For instance, in the absence of a state-created
expectation, prisoners have no constitutionally protected right to
parole70 or good-time credits.7" But a prisoner released on parole
acquires a conditional liberty interest, so some process is due before
parole revocation.7" Prisoners also have no constitutional right to
remain in any one institution,7 3 except in cases involving involuntary

transfer to a mental hospital.74 Due process requires a hearing conducted by an independent decisionmaker prior to such commitment.7 5
B.

Due Process Analysis. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge
Balancing Test to Harper

The Harper court held that inmates have a constitutional right to
refuse antipsychotics, but failed to indicate whether its source is the
state or the federal constitution. 6 If the court found the liberty interthe interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the
fourteenth amendment).
68. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 563, 571 (1972). Liberty interests are often found
to extend directly from the Constitution. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 679-80
(2d ed. 1988).
69. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Liberty interests may also exist where the state has created a
reasonable expectation of the liberty. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). See generally Herman, The New Liberty. The ProceduralDue
ProcessRights ofPrisonersand Others Under the BurgerCourt, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 503-21,
543-55 (1984) (analysis of liberty interests as they arise from state statutes).
70. Greenholtz 442 U.S. at 11.
71. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (good-time credits allow an inmate to gain
early release).
72. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
73. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
74. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (explaining that commitment to a mental hospital
is not a condition of confinement incident to a prison sentence for criminal conviction).
75. Id. at 495. Prior to Vitek the Washington Supreme Court held in Harmon v. McNutt
that prisoners were entitled to ajudicial hearing prior to transfer to a mental health facility. 91
Wash. 2d 126, 131, 587 P.2d 537, 540 (1978). Despite this holding, inmates do not receive
judicial hearings prior to transfer to the SOC. Telephone interview with Donald Bonamy, SOC
Superintendent (Nov. 17, 1988) (notes on file with Washington Law Review). Officials at the SOC
claim that judicial hearings are not mandated, because the SOC is a "correctional institution,"
not a "facility for the care of the mentally ill." Id. Thus, the transfer is an interprison transfer
for which no hearing is required. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225. But this distinction is without
substance and may conflict with the intent of Washington law. WASH. REv. CODE § 72.68.035
(1987), governing institutional transfers, expressly provides that "facility for the care of the
mentally ill" refers to state mental facilities, regardless of their location inside or outside
correctional institutions.
76. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 881-82, 759 P.2d 358, 364 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 1337 (1989).
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est in the federal Constitution, then Harper's protections may exceed
the federal minimum." To avoid the problem of relying on federal
protection that may not exist, the court should have identified a state
law source of the right to refuse."8
Assuming the fourteenth amendment protects the right to refuse,
the extent of due process protection may be determined according to
the balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge.7 9 This test
requires courts to consider, in substance: (1) the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional procedures would entail; and, (4) the probable value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.8"
Applying the Mathews test to the situation in Harper reveals the
strengths and weaknesses of the decision. By helping to isolate relevant factors to be balanced, the Mathews approach demonstrates that
SOC procedures were inadequate to protect inmates' interests. The
Harper court's procedures provide more, but perhaps not enough,
protection.
1.

The Prisoner'sInterest in Refusing Antipsychotic Drugs

The scope of due process protection is determined by the weight of
the interest. The Harper court weighed the liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotic drugs by comparing it to ECT, finding that because
77. The United States Supreme Court has strongly suggested that courts should defer to the
judgments of qualified professionals in matters of treating the mentally disabled. Thus, due
process is met if the inmate receives a "professional judgment" of the necessity of drug treatment.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299-300
(1982). Several United States courts of appeal have held that the professional judgment standard
applies in antipsychotic-refusal cases. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
bane); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987); Rennie v. Klein, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (professional judgment standard applies only when when the patient is
dangerous). So if the Harper court identified a right to refuse only in the federal Constitution,
the state may be bound to no more than the professional judgment standard, regardless of the
procedures specified in Harper. Cf Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1984) (if state
procedures rise above the constitutional minimum, the state could fail to follow its own
procedures, yet escape constitutional scrutiny).
78. Other courts have found the right in state constitutions, statutes, and the common law.
See, e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 540, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 754, review denied,
42 Cal. 3d 692 (1986) (state constitutional and common law source); Jarvis v. Levine, 418
N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988) (state constitutional source).
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
80. Id. at 334-35.
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antipsychotic drug treatment is as intrusive as ECT, due process
requires similar protection. 8 1
Antipsychotic drug treatment and ECT share two factors distinguishing them from other deprivations of liberty: First, both antipsychotics and ECT invade the thought processes; and second, both
cause irreversible side effects.8 2 These traits represent a forfeiture of
liberty interests greater than that generally associated with conviction.
The intended effects of the drugs involve an invasion of the body
beyond mere confinement, and the side effects of the drugs constitute
punishment extending beyond the prisoner's sentence.83 It is therefore
necessary to provide independent oversight paralleling that of such
confinement decisions as sentencing or commitment.
2. The Risk of ErroneousDeprivation Under SOC Procedures
Due process requires a meaningful hearing before depriving the
inmate of a liberty interest.84 The SOC's procedures were inadequate
for meeting this requirement because the decisionmakers were not
independent and because the inmates lacked adequate notice and legal
assistance.
a. The Bias of Decisionmakersand the DecisionmakingProcess
The Harpercourt concluded that a judicial hearing is required prior
to involuntary drug treatment. Findings tending to show that SOC
decisionmakers and existing procedures were biased
against the inmate
85
refusing antipsychotics support this holding.
The decision reflects several underlying concerns about the decision
to treat an inmate involuntarily. First, involuntary administration of
antipsychotics may be motivated by a desire to punish or control,
rather than to treat.8 6 Second, even in the absence of unacceptable
81. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 878, 759 P.2d at 362.
82. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 436-37, 421 N.E.2d 40, 52-53 (1981)
(because of antipsychotics' effect on the thought processes and the likelihood of irreversible side
effects, the drugs should be treated like ECT).
83. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text (discussing the beneficial and adverse
effects of antipsychotic drugs); supra note 60 (discussing the adverse side effects of ECT).
84. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
85. See Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 878-79, 759 P.2d 358, 362-363 (1988), cert
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (describing sources of
bias and conflict of interest).
86. Several courts have found that institutions used antipsychotic drugs for the convenience
of the staff and for punishment. See, eg., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926-27 (N.D.
Ohio 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1302 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Commissioner of
Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 320-21 (1983); see also Brooks, supra
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motives, the psyphiatric community has evinced indifference to
patients' interests in refusing treatment.8 7 Finally, unlike civilly committed individuals,88 inmates do not receive a judicial hearing prior to
transfer to the SOC.8 9 Therefore, without independent review prior to
involuntary treatment, there is no guarantee that the inmate's interests
have been considered.
Providing a judicial hearing alone, however, may not confer adequate protection. Empirical evidence shows that judges using a standard similar to that announced in Harper sided with the doctors
ninety-six percent of the time. 90 The risk of erroneous deprivation of
liberty may therefore remain significant despite the presence of an
impartial decisionmaker. 9 1
b.

Inadequate Notice and Assistancefor the Inmate

The Harper court held that due process requires reasonable notice
and the assistance of counsel. 92 Adequate notice and assistance ensure
that the individual's hearing has meaning and provides an actual
opportunity to thwart the state action. The difference between invol-

note 11, at 188-89; Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 363, 366-68 (1980).
87. One author, in an article analyzing the evolution of the right to refuse, fails to even
mention the side effects of antipsychotic drugs. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with
Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1988). The
psychiatric community has also been slow to accept that the doctrine of informed consent applies
to voluntary treatment with antipsychotics. See, e.g., D. JEsTE & R. WYATT, supra note 11, at
290 (only 11% of senior psychiatrists from 42 institutions favored written consent for long-term
drug treatment).
88. Washington citizens have the right to a jury trial prior to commitment to a mental
hospital, as well as assistance of counsel and a medical professional. WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 71.05.300-.310 (1987).
89. See supra note 75.
90. Hoge, Gutheil & Kaplan, The Right To Refuse Treatment Under Rogers v. Commissioner:
PreliminaryEmpiricalFindingsand Comparisons, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163,
167 (1987) (the researchers also cited studies from other hospitals where the rate of upheld
refusals varied between 3% and 33%).
91. It is too early to tell what percentage of refusals will be upheld by Washington judges. As
of November 4, 1988, the court had ordered treatment in the only case it had heard. Telephone
interview with Donald Bonamy, SOC Superintendent (Nov. 4, 1988) (notes on file with
Washington Law Review).
92. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 884, 759 P.2d 358, 365 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
1337 (1989). Prior SOC procedures gave twenty-four hours' notice and the assistance of a lay
adviser. Id. at 879, 759 P.2d at 362. Harper's adviser was a nurse practitioner employed by the
DOC. Brief for Amici Curiae at 20, Harper (No. 54045-4).

470

Refusing Antipsychotic Drugs
untary drug treatment and other types of deprivations of liberty asso93
ciated with incarceration supports the Harpercourt's conclusion.
The Harper court's requirement of reasonable notice and time to
prepare,94 however, provides little guidance to lower courts. Preparing for a Harper hearing may require more than meeting with the
appointed attorney to discuss the case. In particular, an inmate refusing to continue treatment with antipsychotics should be given time to
withdraw from the drugs, 95 so that the inmate appears before the
court just as he appears to prison authorities. The prisoner may also
need time for independent psychiatric examinations. Although current delays in conducting the hearings provide ample time,96 the
court's failure to define explicitly "reasonable notice" may prejudice
inmates in the future.
3.

The State's Interests: Treating Prisonersand Avoiding
Administrative Burdens

The right to refuse antipsychotics can be overcome only by a compelling state interest. The Harper court identified four compelling
interests, but failed to define them within the narrow context of drug
treatment, and further failed to acknowledge other important interests
in treating inmates. Moreover, the court did not address the state's
interest in retaining its administrative procedures for overriding
refusals.
a

Interests Recognized by the Harper Court

The court approved a nonexclusive list of four state interests compelling enough to override the inmate's interest in refusing treatment:
Preserving life, protecting third parties' interests, preventing suicide,
and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.97 This
list reflects a superficial analysis of the legitimate interests of the state.
These interests have been cited by most courts in the narrow context
93. See, eg., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980) (a prisoner suffering from mental
disease needs legal assb3tance, because the prisoner is unlikely to be able to understand or exercise

his or her rights).
94. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 884, 759 P.2d at 365.
95. The amount of time this takes depends on the drug and the patient. Some types of
antipsychotics remain effective for weeks after the injection. See Gibson, DepotFluphenazineand

Tardive Dyskinesia in an OutpatientPopulation,in TARDIVE DYSKINESIA, supra note 28, at 315,
317, 322-23.
96. Currently, there are delays of several weeks between the inmate's refusal and the Harper
hearing. Telephone interview with Gary Wellman, supra note 17.
97. Harper,110 Wash. 2d 873, 883, 759 P.2d 358, 364; see In re Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500,
508, 723 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1986).
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of lifesaving treatments,9 8 and cannot be applied satisfactorily in the
context of involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs. Therefore,
the Harpercourt failed to provide the guidance lower courts will need
to balance fairly state and inmate interests.
Involuntary treatment with antipsychotics cannot be justified by a
state interest in preserving life. In In re Colyer,9 9 for example, the

court determined that the state's interest in preserving life requires
lifesaving treatment for nonconsenting patients."° This interest is not
implicated where lifesaving treatment is not at issue. 10 1
Involuntary treatment similarly may not be justifiable to protect
third parties' interests. In Colyer, the court found that there were no
relevant third party interests, because the patient had no children or
other dependents.102 As thus defined under Washington law, this
interest would seldom be implicated by the inmate's refusal of antipsychotics. 103 The scope of this interest could easily be broadened to
include protecting other third parties, such as fellow inmates and staff
members." ° But the Harper court's failure to depart explicitly from
the common law scope of third party interests leaves a significant gap
where the state's legitimate interest in protection ought to appear.1 5
The two remaining Schuoler interests also invite criticism. The
state's interest in preventing suicide may justify forcibly medicating an
98. See In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 842-43, 689 P.2d 1363, 1371-72 (1984)
(incompetent patient had right to choose a cancer treatment less likely to save her life than that
favored by her doctors); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (comatose patient's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment was not outweighed by state interests), modified, In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (individual in persistent vegetative state had right to
terminate life support systems).
99. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
100. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743.
101. Courts apparently distinguish between preserving life and preventing suicide. Because
psychosis is not terminal, the only threat to the life of the inmate is that of suicide. See infra
notes 106-111 and accompanying text (discussing the state interest in preventing suicide).
102. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743. The state interest in protecting third
parties' interests can be traced to In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (state interest in protecting the
patient's minor children from abandonment justified an unwanted blood transfusion).
103. Prisoners generally do not support their dependents. An inmate in Washington can earn
between $19.80 and $30 per month. Essentially all of these earnings are spent in the prison store,
rather than contributed to the inmate's family. Telephone interview with Ted Wilson, SOC
Corrections Mental Health Program Manager (Dec. 21, 1988) (notes on file with Washington
Law Review).
104. One court has taken this step. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421
N.E.2d 40, 60 (1981).
105. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing the state's overriding interest
in controlling inmates and protecting others).
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inmate. But this interest should be balanced carefully against the
inmate's interest in refusal."0 6 There are alternative means in most
cases for preventing suicide, such as mechanical restraints and isolation." 7 As the court explained in In re Ingram, "I where the choice is
between alternative treatments, the patient's interest should generally
control.10 9 Even if it appears that suicide can be prevented only with
antipsychotics, the drugs need only be administered for a short time to
prevent the imminent danger.11 o Furthermore, some research suggests
that antipsychotic drugs may actually induce suicidal tendencies, so
long-term administration of the drugs to deter suicide may do more
harm than good. 1
Finally, the state's interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession is open to abuse. This interest generally applies
when the patient's choice requires the treating physician to take steps,
or withhold actions, that conflict with the physician's ethical responsibilities.I 2 But the scope of this interest must be limited to preserving
the essential ethical values of medicine. If the court allows doctors to
elevate the choice of alternate treatments to an ethical issue in a nonlifesaving context, then important quality-of-life decisions will be
106. See generally DuBose, Of the ParensPatriaeCommitment Powerand Drug Treatment of
Schizophrenia:"Do the Benefits to the PatientJustify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MiNN. L. REv.
1149, 1213 (1976) (noting that the rate of suicide among schizophrenics may not be significantly
higher than that of the general population, and that the number of lives that could be saved by
preventing suicide is probably not greater than the number that might be lost from side effects).
107. The SOC uses mechanical restraints and isolation when inmates are dangerous to
themselves. Telephone interview with Gary Wellman, supra note 17.
108. 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984).
109. Id. at 843, 689 P.2d at 1371-72. The court stated:
This case does not present a choice between life and death. It presents a choice between two
treatments, one carrying a greater curative potential, but the other offering less severe side
effects. A person's right to self-determination includes the power to choose between these
two treatments. Ingram does not lose this right of self-determination merely by virtue of her
incompetence.
Id. Thus, the issue is not whether isolation or restraints are medically preferable to antipsychotics, but whether the inmate loses the right to choose.
110. The drugs have an almost immediate sedative effect, Gaughan & LaRue, supra note 2, so
use of drugs in combination with isolation or restraints should deter suicide.
11. Zander, Prolixin Decanoate. A Review of the Research, MENTAL DISABILiTY L. REP.
July-Aug. 1977, at 37, 40; see also Gardos & Cole, supranote 33, at 777. Some courts specifically
authorize involuntary drugging when the patient is suicidal, but require judicial review as soon as
possible to continue treatment. See, eg., People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973-75 (Colo. 1985).
112. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 843, 689 P.2d at 1371; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 123, 660
P.2d 738, 743-44 (1983). The interest in preserving medical ethics stems from In re President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., where the court found a state interest in protecting
medical professionals from criminal and civil liability. 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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made by doctors, not patients. 1 3 Therefore, preserving the ethical
integrity of the medical profession, standing alone, should not be a
state interest compelling enough to override the inmate's interest in
refusing antipsychotic drug treatment.
The interests articulated by the court are not wholly inappropriate
for balancing state and individual interests in forced treatment with
antipsychotic drugs. However, because these interests are rarely
applied in cases involving nonlifesaving treatment, the court should
have more clearly defined their application in the context of involuntary drug treatment. Otherwise, the ambiguously defined state interests may expand and consume the inmate's interests.
b.

The State's Interests in Control and Treatment

The Harper court did not expressly recognize the state's interest in
controlling prisoners who present a danger to others."1 4 Such an interest is generally found to stem from the state's police power.1

5

Most

courts facing the issue of involuntary drug treatment have concluded
that the state has a cognizable interest in maintaining a controlled
environment in state institutions. 1 16 Several courts, however, treat the
environmental interest with skepticism, because institutions have
abused their power by suppressing entire wards of mental hospitals.l1 7
Therefore, the scope of the interest in control and protection must be
clearly limited to situations where the inmate presents a palpable danger. The Harper court's requirement that the treatment be "necessary
and effective" will do little to check abuse of police power. A better
solution is to allow the use of antipsychotics in emergencies without a

113. This concern lies at the heart of the decision in Ingram, where the patient preferred a
shorter life with her vocal cords over a longer life without them. Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 843,
689 P.2d at 1371-72.
114. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (noting that an interest in controlling
inmates might be implied from the state interest in protecting third parties' interests).
115. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 934- 35 (N.D. Ohio 1980); People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 971 (Colo. 1985); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390
Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 319-22 (1983).
116. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984); Large v. Superior Court, 148
Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d 399, 406 (1986). This interest serves to protect staff and other inmates, and
to create an environment conducive to the well-being of all patients. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note
11, at 204 (explaining that refusing patients will disrupt inpatient wards, agitate other patients,
and damage the "therapeutic ambience").
117. See supra note 86 (citing cases in which courts found that drugs were used for
punishment and staff convenience).
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hearing, but to allow continued drug treatment only if a court finds
that it furthers a therapeutic interest." 8
The state may also have a legitimate interest in treating mentally ill
inmates.' 1 9 Courts often cite the state's parens patriae' 20 interest in
treating individuals.1 21 The state's interest may also derive from its
constitutional duty to provide medical care to prison inmates. 22
However, the duty to provide treatment should not produce a corresponding duty to accept unwanted treatment, unless the illness is
infectious and poses a threat to others. 123 Even if the state has an
interest in treating the prisoner's mental illness, this interest does not
support involuntary treatment with antipsychotic drugs, which are not
24
a cure. 1

c.

The State's Interest in Avoiding the Administrative and Fiscal
Burdens of JudicialHearings

The Harpercourt failed to address the considerable administrative
burden that judicial hearings may cause. These include the possibility
of substantial delays, 125 during which time the inmate may require
special supervision,' 2 6 and the considerable amount of preparation
required. 127 Judicial hearings and appointed counsel will undoubtedly
118. Several courts have adopted this approach. See, eg., Large, 714 P.2d at 407-08;
Medina, 705 P.2d at 971; Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 319-22; Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 496,495
N.E.2d 337, 343 (1986).
119. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). See generally DuBose, supra note 106,
at 1149-97.
120. Parens patriae refers to the status of the state as guardian of persons under legal
disability. BLACK'S LAW DImONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
121. See, eg., Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 554, 465 A.2d 484, 490 (1983); Rivers, 67
N.Y.2d at 496-97, 495 N.E.2d at 343; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(strongly suggesting that a state that confines an individual for the purpose of treatment has a
duty to provide minimal treatment). But see Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health,
390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (1983) (state interest in seeing that its residents function at
the maximum level of their capacity does not outweigh the right to refuse antipsychotics).
122. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
123. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984) (duty is to provide treatment
the inmate desires, and the requirement "cannot be turned on its head" to allow forcible
treatment), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
124. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) (the state's interests in treatment
weaken and the right to privacy grows as "the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims").
125. As of November 4, 1988, one SOC case had been pending for eight weeks, and three
more weeks were likely to pass before the hearing. Telephone interview with Gary Wellman,
supra note 17; see also Hoge, Gutheil & Kaplan, supra note 90, at 167 (citing delays of four and
one-half months for hearings in one area).
126. Telephone interview with Gary Wellman, supra note 17 (the SOC uses isolation and
mechanical restraints to control dangerous inmates awaiting hearings).
127. Id. (explaining that the "paper chase," more than anything else, was a burden on staff).
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cost more than SOC procedures. However, the SOC may respond to
this by seeking a limited number of hearings.1" 8 This will help minimize costs, while ensuring that only those inmates who pose the most
immediate threat will be subjected to involuntary treatment with
antipsychotics-the goal of Harper.
4. ProvidingAdditional ProceduralSafeguards:
Where Harper Falls Short
Additional procedural safeguards are valuable if they reduce the
chance that an individual will be erroneously deprived of liberty. The
Harper court's requirements of a judicial hearing and the substituted
judgment standard provide a measure of protection significantly
greater than SOC procedures. 2 9 These measures protect the inmate
from biased proceedings and ensure that the inmate's actual desires
1 30
are considered.
But the Harper provisions fall short of providing solid protection
against unnecessary treatment with antipsychotics. The court failed to
define its requirement that drug treatment be necessary and effective
This criterion may embody what
for furthering a state interest.'
restrictive
alternative" analysis: if a less
many courts label the "least
restrictive treatment exists, the court does not authorize drug treatment. 132 Without clarification of the standard, however, courts may
approve involuntary drug treatment simply because no evidence of less
33
restrictive alternatives has been offered.'
128. Although the Harper decision forced the SOC to stop administering antipsychotics to
nine inmates, the SOC sought only three judicial hearings to override the inmates' refusals.
Telephone interview with Donald Bonamy, supra note 91.
129. However, both requirements have been criticized. Doctors typically urge that the
decision should be made by the treating psychiatrist or by independent doctors, rather than by a
judge. See generally Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 418. The substituted judgment standard has
been criticized for being little more than a "best interests" test disguised as a determination of
what the patient, if competent, would really decide. Rhoden, supra note 86, at 400-02.
130. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing the bias in SOC procedures);
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the substituted judgment standard).
131. See Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 883, 759 P.2d 358, 364 (1988) (citing In re
Schuoler, 106 Wash. 2d 500, 509, 723 P.2d 1103, 1108-09 (1986)), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1337
(1989).
132. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984) (where state interests
conflict with personal liberties, the state interest must be promoted in such a way as to "result in
the minimum possible infringement of protected rights"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985);
Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 274-77 (3d Cir. 1983) (Weis, J., concurring).
133. Less restrictive alternatives to antipsychotic drug therapy may include tranquilizers,
sedatives, isolation, or even no treatment at all. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493
(4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on rehearing,863 F.2d 302 (1988); Bee, 744 F.2d at 1396. Opinions may
differ as to whether methods such as isolation and mechanical restraints are less restrictive than
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Another shortcoming of the Harperdecision is that it did not provide the inmate a right to an expert witness.13 4 The lack of an expert
may place an insurmountable burden on the inmate. While an attorney can help the inmate rebut evidence concerning violent behavior,
counsel will be of little use in rebutting the state's medical evidence.13 5
Because an inmate who needs state appointed counsel may also be
unable to afford an expert witness,1 36 the only medical evidence
presented will come from SOC doctors. Thus, the inmate will be
unable to present evidence to show that treatment with antipsychotics
is unnecessary.
The Harper decision also fails to provide the inmate with an
independent psychiatric examination. 3 ' Such a requirement would be
a useful alternative to a state compensated expert witness, and could
provide sufficient evidence for the inmate to rebut the need for treatment. While the use of neutral experts has been criticized as constitutionally insufficient,' 3 8 such assistance provides a source of evidence
untainted by conflict of interest, and is presumably objective.
III.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Harper v. State recognizes the important right of
prisoners to refuse noncurative treatment with antipsychotic drugs
and thus avoid their severe, potentially permanent side effects. The
court's new procedures will provide substantial protection for inmates
who refuse antipsychotics. But the decision failed to define key elements, including the source of the right to refuse, relevant state interests in overriding an inmate's refusal, and the test for determining
whether treatment is necessary and effective. Further, the procedures
antipsychotic medication. But the least restrictive alternative standard assures that alternatives
will be considered.
134. Amici for Harper argued that expert testimony was needed. Brief for Amici at 19,
Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988) (No. 54045-4). Interestingly, the court
in Harmon v. McNutt concluded that such expert assistance was necessary when an inmate is
faced with transfer to a mental hospital. 91 Wash. 2d 126, 131, 587 P.2d 537, 540 (1978). Thus,
if an inmate is transferred to an 6utside mental hospital, instead of to the SOC, expert assistance
is required.
135. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-83 (1985) (state must provide psychiatric
assistance to an indigent criminal defendant whose sanity is at issue, because "the assistance of a
psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense"). Although
criminal culpability is not at issue here, the stakes are similar-a loss of liberty over and above
that which is already suffered due to conviction.
136. See supra note 103 (discussing the earnings of prisoners).
137. An independent examination differs from an expert witness in that the examiner merely
provides a second opinion, and is not necessarily a witness for the inmate.
138. See, eg., Note, Expert Services and the Indigent CriminalDefendant: The Constitutional
Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1326, 1345-57 (1986).
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lack such important substantive protections as expert assistance for
the inmate.
A superior approach would be to honor the inmate's refusal except
where a state interest in protecting the inmate or others from harm
exists, and where no less restrictive alternative would suffice. Such an
approach obviates the need for a substituted judgment of an incompetent prisoner's desires, and shifts the focus of the inquiry to whether
the state has shown the necessity of using antipsychotic drugs. The
goals of Harper would thus be preserved by allowing the individual, in
all but extreme cases, to make difficult choices regarding treatment
having a greater potential for harming than for curing mental illness.
Amanda E. Lee
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